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MEXICAN NOTES AND PERSONALITIES OF 
THE STRUGGLE FOR TEXAS" 
years ago there appeared a humorous little essay, 
the object of which has to show the relationship be- S O M E  
tween the idiom and temperament of a people; in other 
words, that people speak as they act. As illustrations the 
author took the French and Spanish equivalents of our 
English locution "to take a walk." The French, he said, say 
"faire une promenade" ("to make a walk"). This is a reflec- 
tion of the French active and creative nature. As one example 
of their propensity for "making" things, notice the gestures 
they make when they talk. On the other hand, the Spanish 
say "dar un paseo" ("to give a walk"). We know how care- 
free and generous the Spanish are: they gave away all their 
priceless possessions in America without asking for even a 
song in return. Then finally the English say "to take a walk." 
Nothing, he concluded, could be more characteristic of the 
English: if anyone wants to give anything away, the English 
are always ready to take it. 
The Mexicans and Americans surely inherited those re- 
spective traits from their Spanish and English forebears, 
judging by the manner in which they dealt with the problem 
of Texas. Josk Maria Tornel, the Mexican Secretary of War 
during the Texas Revolution, succintly declared in 1837: 
"We made a gift of Texas to the North Ameri~ans."~ Per- 
haps it was inevitable that the Americans should come into 
possession of Texas, but most Americans feel that the day 
was hastened by the indiscretion of the Spanish and Mexi- 
cans in opening up that territory to foreign colonization. 
" A public lecture delivered at the Rice Institute on October 19, 
1952. 
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There were a few Mexican statesmen, like General Manuel 
de Mier y Terkn, commandant general of the Mexican East- 
ern Interior Provinces which included Texas, who warned 
of what he called the imperialistic tendencies of the neigh- 
bor to the North saying: "These American advance settlers 
travel wit11 their political constitution in their pockets, 
demanding the privileges, authority and officers which such 
a constitution  guarantee^."^ And Luis de Onis, who nego- 
tiated the Florida treaty with the United States in 1819, 
whereby we renounced all claims to Texas in return for the 
cession of West Florida, commented: "They consider them- 
selves superior . . . and destined to become the sublime 
colossus of human p ~ w e r . " ~  
But such foresight was the exception rather than the rule, 
We do not presume to know what prompted the Spanish to 
grant a charter to Moses Austin to settle three lluildred 
American families in Texas, but we may make conjectures 
as to why the Mexicans, after their independence, confirmed 
this first grant and issued many more during the following 
ten years. One reason, no doubt, was the inexperience of the 
Mexicans in the field of international relations. At the time 
of their independence only eighteen of 754 persons holding 
the highest political offices were native born." The other 
9734. per cent were replaced by untrained Mexicans who 
were to cut their diplomatic teeth on this very problem of 
Texas. 
A second reason for Mexican indulgence was the feeIing 
of gratitude for the aid which the United States had given 
the Mexicans in their struggle for independence, and the 
prompt official recognition which we accorded them in 1821. 
But a third, and perhaps the most forceful reason was 
the opinion that the prosperity and rapid development of 
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the United States was due, in large part, to its policy of 
free immigration. This the Mexicans proceeded to adopt, 
with disastrous results. From the first Spanish settlements in 
Texas in the sixteenth century until 1821-a period of three 
hundred years-the white population of Texas had reached 
a bare four thousand. Evidence of the greater enterprise 
of the Americans may be found in the increase of popula- 
tion to thirty-five thousand in 1835, just fourteen years after 
Stephen F. Austin arrived with the first American settlers. 
Our earliest claims to Texas may be said to date from 1803 
when we purchased the territory of Louisiana. The French 
and Spanish had never agreed on a definite boundary be- 
tween their colonies of Louisiana and Mexico, though the 
French, more occupied in continental European entangle- 
ments, as well as being in violent contact with the British 
in North America, never seriously challenged the Spanish 
occupation as far as the Sabine River. Neither did they re- 
linquish their claim to territory west of that point, and thus 
we acquired this boundary dispute at the same time we 
acquired Louisiana. When Jefferson authorized Robert 
Livingston, our minister to France, to offer ten million dollars 
for Louisiana, it was only for that portion east of the Missis- 
sippi River. Time and again Livingston had to remind the 
French, who wished to sell the entire territory, that we did 
not wish to extend our boundaries beyond the Mississippi. 
When, finally, he and James Monroe, who had been ap- 
pointed special envoy to aid in the purchase, paid fifteen 
million dollars for the whole of Louisiana, they were so fear- 
ful of being reprimanded or even recalled and repudiated, 
that they felt obliged to write a letter of apology to Secre- 
tary of State James Madison. 
But the Mexicans embrace the faUacious notion that Jef- 
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ferson and his predecessors had always had greedy eyes set 
upon Texas. Seiior Tomel, to whom we have already re- 
ferred, said: 
For more than fifty years, that is, from the very period of 
their political infancy, the prevailing thought in the United 
States has been the acquisition of the greater part of the 
territory that formerly belonged to Spain, particularly that 
part which today belongs to the Mexican nation. Democrats 
and Federalists, all their political parties, have been in per- 
fect accord upon one point, their desire to extend the limits 
of the republic to the north, to the south, and to the west, 
using for the purpose all the m a n s  at their command, 
guided by cunning deceit and bad faiths6 
Once we had acquired territory west of the Mississippi, 
Jefferson wanted all that belonged to us, and he thought that 
might include at  least a portion of Texas. This led the Mexi- 
cans to charge: "The United States . . . . took care . . . to 
draw up the treaty of saIe in such elastic terms as would 
permit territory that had never belonged to France to be 
included as part of the p~rchase."~ 
Despite our vague title to this territory west of the Sabine, 
President Monroe, in his anxiety to get West Florida, re- 
nounced all claims to Texas by the treaty of 1819, as we have 
already stated. In  1822, the first Mexican minister to the 
United States proposed that this treaty, whicll you will 
remember had been concluded with Spain, be made the 
basis for settlement of the boundaries between the United 
States and Mexico. Sensing the opportunity of gaining so 
easily a new territory rivaling that of Louisiana, we evaded 
a direct reply. We had recognized the rights of Spain to 
Texas, but now that Spain had been driven from this con- 
tinent, why should this territory not as well be ours? Notice 
our change of opinion in less than twenty years after the 
whole of Louisiana was, to our distaste, thrust upon us. 
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Before 1821 there were probably not one hundred Ameri- 
cans in Texas. The few traders and adventurers who entered 
in defiance of Spanish decrees were usually shot on the spot 
or, at best, led off to imprisonnlent in Mexico. One such 
intruder was Lieutenant Augustus McGee who, in 1813, led 
a snlall army with the avowed purpose of supporting the 
struggle for Mexican independence. In the ranks of the 
Spanish army that defeated McGee near San Antonio was 
a young sub-lieutenant named Antonio L6pez de Santa Anna, 
making his first visit to the land where, a quarter of a cen- 
tury later, he was to suffer his most humiliating defeat. 
In December, 1821, the advailce guard of Austin's colony 
arrived and a few days later the first colony of Americans in 
Texas was founded on the banks of the Brazos, some fifty or 
sixty miles from Houston. After the first few land grants to 
the Americans were confirmed by the Mexican National 
Congress, authority for further action was transferred to 
Saltillo, the capital of the combined states of Coahuila and 
Texas. Wit11 land grants under state control, corruption ran 
rampant. One Mexican historian asserts that the Mexicans 
were so confused and so ignorant of what they possessed 
that the same grant was often issued to two or more em- 
presarios, and sometimes land involved lay entirely within 
the bounds of the United States. Chaos was intensified by 
land speculators who swarmed into Nacogdoches and set 
up offices to sell property which they did not even possess. 
The Mexican officials actually did not know the extent of 
their territory: to them Texas meant t l~a t  portion lying 
southeast of a line running northward from Laredo to San 
Antonio then northeastward to Nacogdoches. Even as late 
as 1848, after the war with the United States, the Mexican 
government did not realize the immensity of their loss. The 
30 The Rice Institute Pamphlet 
official map of this section then in use was published in 
London many years before, and was, one may surmise from 
the following incident, highly inaccurate. In 1854 a Mexi- 
can map-maker, Antonio Garcia Cubas, presented what he 
termed a "true map" to Santa Anna, who looked at it for 
some time in astonishment. Then, quoting Cubas: 
On observing on i t  the great expanse of the territory which 
our neighbor so unjustly snatched from us, he uttered I don't 
remember what words filled with bitterness, at which I could 
not help being surprised, for I noticed that before the presen- 
tation of that map, no one had the least idea of the im- 
portance of the territory which had been l0st.7 
As the population of Texas grew, so grew the unrest at the 
uncompronlising policy of the Mexican government in re- 
gard to the establishment of local courts, and the questions 
of slavery, religious tolerance, military garrisons, and im- 
migration. The measures adopted by the Mexicans for deal- 
ing with these matters, studied in the light of reason, could 
not be called oppressive. They pointed up the illogic of 
burdening the Mexican people with the expense of courts 
for the colonists who, themselves, paid no taxes whatsoever. 
As for slavery, the state constitution of 1824 forbade the 
importation of slaves. I t  further provided that those already 
within the territory could be kept, but the Negroes born in 
Texas should be free. However, the Mexicans did recognize 
work contracts, even those made in the United States. It 
was an easy matter for an American to bring in slaves under 
the pretense of free men, but actually bound by contract 
executed in the United States to work for him until they 
repaid their transportation and keep. The masters usually 
saw to it that the wages were low enough and the expenses 
great enough to require a lifetime to repay. 
On the matter of religious tolerance, the settlers had abso- 
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lutely no grounds for complaint. The legal grants issued by 
the Spaniards and Mexicans stipulated that all settlers 
brought in must be Catholic, for no other religion was 
allowed. However, this intolerance did not create any undue 
anxiety among the preponderantly Protestant colonists, who 
found the greatest inconvenience to be that of having to 
await the annual visit of the priest to legalize the marriages 
contracted during the previous year. 
I t  was Commandant General Terhn who advocated in- 
creased military garrisons, presumably to enforce the neg- 
lected customs laws, but in reality to keep an eye on the 
restive population. It was he, too, who recommended 
counterbalancing the growing American population with an 
equal number of Mexicans. But no volunteers could be 
found, not even in the Mexican prisons, the inmates of 
which were pron~ised amnesty, free land, and other incen- 
tives if they would settle in Texas. Apparently they pre- 
ferred the security of the prisons to the free enterprise 
system. 
Seeing that a balance could not be affected, General Terhn 
stated: "If the colonization contracts in Texas by North 
Americans are not suspended, and if the establishments are 
not watched, it is necessary to say that the province is 
already delivered to the  foreigner^."^ Accordingly, immi- 
gration was forbidden by the decree of April 6, 1830. This 
decree was the greatest single cause of the Texas Revolu- 
tion, for it engendered great bitterness in the colonists, 
nearly all of whom had friends or relatives who wished to 
join them. 
In 1832 came the prelude to the Revolution in the form 
of uprisings against three or four customs stations and mili- 
tary garrisons, particularly those at Anahuac, Velasco, and 
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Nacogdoches. These uprisings came at the very moment 
Santa Anna was overthrowing Bustamante and assuming 
the presidency for the first of seven times. This was also the 
same year that General TerAn committed suicide or was 
assassinated, depending on whether you accept the version 
of Santa Anna who hated him, or of Bustamante whom he 
loyally served. The Americans took advantage of this change 
in the Mexican government to protest that their activities 
were not directed against Mexican authority as such, but 
merely against Bustamante and in support of Santa Anna. 
Santa Anna had his doubts about this declaration of 
allegiance and sent Colonel Jose Antonio Mejia to Texas to 
report on conditions and to quell any outbreaks. Mejia was 
warmly welcomed as the accredited envoy of Santa Anna 
with a twenty-one gun salute when he landed at Brazoria in 
July, 1832. The colonists entertained Mejia lavishly, and, 
as he was a heavy drinker, many a toast was drunk to his 
master. At a public dinner and ball given in honor of the 
- 
eminent visitor, the latter declared: 
The cause which you have thus adopted is that of the people 
against oppression; that of the friends of federal institutions 
lagainst the militaly and oppressive government which the 
ministers of General Bustamante wished to establish. These 
being the principles which influence this respectable com- 
munity, 1 should be inconsistent with my own principles 
were I not to offer them my friendship and the support of 
the chief under whose orders I am actinga 
The apprel~ensive colonists were, naturally, quite relieved 
to hear such words of praise, and they were thankful that 
the vagaries of Mexican politics had offered them such a 
convenient alibi. Mejia was so convinced of the loyalty of 
the Texans that he sailed for Mexico eight days later, setting 
no restraints upon the population, but rather entrusting 
them with the task of reducing yet another Mexican garri- 
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son, the one commanded by the pro-Bustamante Colonel 
Piedras at Nacogdoches. 
Santa Anna's suspicions concerning the Texans were re- 
kindled, if indeed they had ever been extinguished, by the 
San Felipe conventions of 1832 and 1833 which petitioned 
for separate statehood from Coahuila and for the repeal of 
the restrictions on immigration. Santa Anna therefore sent 
his brother-in-law, General Cos, with a small force to San 
Antonio, from which place the latter was expelled late in 
1835 by a certain element of the population popularly known 
as the war party. 
Mexican historians have taken a surprisingly lenient atti- 
tude towards the earlier American colonists, notably those of 
Stephen F. Austin, in contrast to the vituperation heaped 
upon the newcomers, or the war party, whom they blamed 
for the seething rebellion. One writer said: 
The colonists of Texas, on whom political passion imposed so 
many burdens, remained aloof from the conspiracy of the 
lawyers and land speculators of Nacogdoches. The empre- 
sario Stephen F. Austin was also opposed to the conspiracy 
until the last. For the war party which was organized in 
the small population of extreme northern Mexico [that is, 
Texas] there were no colonists, no federal constitution, no 
Mexican government. . . . The lawyers and speculators saw 
a vast and beautiful territory to conquer for the United 
States, and, impelled by the dominating current of the Nash- 
ville School [principally Andrew Tackson and Sam Houston] 
they prepared war, . .- .lo 
Santa Anna, writing on the same subject, declared: 
Few of the colonists, properly speaking have taken up arms 
in the struggle. The soldiers of Travis at the Alamo, those 
of Fannin at Perdido, the riflemen of Dr. Grant, and Houston 
himself and his troops at San Jacinto, with but few excep- 
tions, were publicly known to have come from New Orleans 
and other points of the neighboring republic exclusively for 
the purpose of aiding the Texas rebellion without ever hav- 
ing been members of any of the colonization grants.lL 
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Eugene Barker, one of Texas's most illustrious historians, 
chaIlenges these statements, declaring: 
When all is said, it was realIy the old settlers who did almost 
unaided all the effectual fighting in the Texas Revolution. , . . 
Practically alone they won the battle of San Jacinto.12 
Such men as Burnet, Borden, Williamson, the Wharton 
brothers, and Houston the Mexicans classed as outsiders, and 
it is true that none of them had renounced his American 
citizenship. In one Mexican history Sam Houston is quoted 
as having said, after a night of reveling in Washington: "Yes, 
yes! I am called to enjoy the throne of the Monte~umas."'~ 
If that throne could still be considered extant, it was at that 
time occupied by the most controversial figure in all Mexi- 
can politics-that ciuel, despotic egoist, Santa Anna. 
These two claimants to the throne of the Montezumas, 
Sam Houston and Santa Anna, were to meet upon the world 
stage for one fleeting moment in a battle which another 
Texas historian maintains must be reckoned the sixteenth 
most important battle of the world, since Creasy did not see 
fit to include it among the fifteen which he treated in his 
monumental work, Decisive Battles of the Wml.d.14 
One might suppose that a man who was called seven times, 
as Santa Anna was (sometimes only by a whisper) to lead 
his country, mostly in times of the severest crises, would be 
revered as a patriot. While he was alternately worshiped 
and execrated by the masses, he was detested then, and is 
now, by almost all government officials and writers who 
have left us their opinions. One recent historian calls Santa 
Anna a "bad general, bad patriot, bad man, and a bad Mexi- 
can." This epithet of "bad Mexican7' was no doubt conferred 
upon him because of a wish he had expressed upon his retun. 
to Mexico from imprisonment in Texas that "Mexicans might, 
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forgetting my political mistakes, not deny me the only title 
I wish to leave my children: that of a 'Good Mexican'."'" 
Carlos Maria de Bustamante, the most notable historian 
of his day (not related to President Anastasio Bustamante) 
said: 
Santa Anna [departed for the Texas campaign] leaving us 
quite fearful of the mad acts he would commit on the expedi- 
tion, but happy both because we no longer had this bungler 
over us and because of a certain hope that we entertained 
that by his own hand h e  was going to incapacitate himself so 
that he would never again rule over the Mexican people.lG 
General Echavhrri, the leading general under Emperor 
Iturbide who misruled Mexico during the first three years of 
its existence mote  of him: 
He lies when he  says he is a soldier: he is unworthy of the 
uniform he wears; he has no friends, for to 'all he has been 
ungrateful; he has no followers, because he has never done 
good to any man; he bas no country because it abominates 
the false one who betrays it to its enemy.17 
Another historian, referring to Santa Anna's liberation by 
Houston, said that "such a notice could not soothe those who 
knew him Even Santa Anna's private secretary 
refers to his "'evident artfulness and characteristic duplic- 
ity."lo Such opinions seem to justify the remark by Mira- 
beau Lamar that 'his death will be as acceptable in Mexico 
as in Texas, and can engender no additional hatred and 
hostility to this country."20 
This is the man, however, who had won the support of 
- - 
the army; and despite national disunity and financial ex- 
haustion of the counhy, he set out from Mexico City in 
November, 1835, with a force of two thousand men, which 
later grew to some seven thousand. The northward march 
from Saltillo began in late January, 1836, during one of the 
coldest and rainiest periods ever experienced in Texas. Many 
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of the Maya Indians from tropical Yucatan died on the trip 
across what the Mexicans termed the "desert," the desolate 
wastes between Monterrey and San Antonio. There was only 
one doctor with three hundred pesos worth of medical sup- 
plies, and there were no hospital trains. One writer speaks 
of helping place the dying on the already overloaded nluni- 
tions wagons. 
Sagging morale was soon bolstered by a costly but com- 
plete victory at the Alamo, March 6,1836. Assunling that no 
Texan would ask, as one of our late presidents is reported 
to have done upon his visit to this state, what the Alamo is, 
we shall limit ousselves to a few observations nude by the 
enemy. Santa Anna's first pronouncement on arriving in 
Texas was as follows: "Our duty has led us to these plains 
to fight tllose ungrateful adventurers on whom o~r t  unwary 
authorities lavished favors not accorded to the Mexicans 
then~selves. Wretches! They shall soon see their n~adness!"~~ 
Speaking later of the Alan10 in his official report to the 
Mexican government, Santa Anna wrote: "I wanted to try a 
generous measure, characteristic of Mexican kindness, and 
I offered life to the defendants who would surrender their 
anns and retire."22 Such an offer actually was made, but 
Travis and his men preferred to die rather than risk becom- 
ing almost certain victims of the General's treache~y. 
Santa Anna reported seventy Mexicans killed and three 
hundred wounded; Secretary Caro said three hundred were 
killed on the field and one hundred more died later; Alcalde 
Ruiz, the chief municipal official of San Antonio, declared 
that he had the task of burying sixteen hundred Mexican 
dead. While the General minimized his own losses, he 
exaggerated those of the Americans, stating: "The corpses 
of six hundred foreigners were buried in the dit~hes."~" 
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This is a typical example of Santa Anna's fondness for telling 
two lies when one would do as well. The figure is known to 
be 181 fighting men, and they were not buried in the ditches, 
but burned. 
Just four days before the slaughter at the Alamo, Texas 
independence was declared at Washington-on-the-Brazos, 
and on the very day that the Alan10 fell, Sam IIouston, the 
commander-in-chief of the Texas army, escorted by four 
men, set off towards San Antonio to meet the Mexicans' six 
thousand. He dared go no farther than Gonzalez, where he 
found 374 men; then he began his long retreat through 
Columbia, San Felipe, then northward along the Brazos to 
about where Hempstead now is, then later to Harrisburg and 
San Jacinto. During this time a portion of the Mexican army 
was often only a day or two behind, and at  one point it 
camped only two miles from the Texas army. This north- 
ward swing was probably occasioned by the news of 
Fannin's defeat and massacre near Goliad by General Urrea, 
who was moving up from Matamoros, nlopping up the 
coastal region. 
Santa Anna stayed in San Antonio until near the end of 
March while a part of his army was yapping at Houston's 
heels. He thought that all effective resistance had been 
crushed, and he planned to return to Mexico. Colonel Juan 
Almonte, Iater Secretary of War and candidate for the presi- 
dency, says that it was only by the greatest insistence that 
he dissuaded the general from doing so. 
As Houston was building up and training his army north 
of San Felipe, Santa Anna arrived at the latter point with 
some twenty-seven hundred men, while two thousand others 
were reasonably close by. Until this time Santa Anna had 
planned to drive eastward and chase the fleeing American 
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settlers across the Sabine, as he had already cleared out all 
the territory west of the Brazos. At this point the Mexican 
commander learned that the provisional Texas government, 
including President Burnet, Vice President De Zavala and 
some of their cabinet, had taken refuge in Harrisburg. Now 
all previous strategy was thrown to the winds. Santa Anna's 
every move was animated by one thought: to capture the 
rebel government leader, execute them, and in one grand 
stroke end all resistance. No one has suggested that this bait 
was deliberately set before Santa Anna, but if so, a bigger 
catch could not have been made. 
Selecting some six hundred of his best soldiers, including 
the cavalry for quick movement, Santa Anna crossed the 
Brazos at Fort Bend, leaving General Filisola, his second in 
command, to con~plete the crossing of the swollen stream, 
while he, Santa Anna, set out for Harrisburg. The other 
generals, Cos, Castrillon, Sesma, Filisola, all thought their 
commander was foolhardy in thus exposing himself with 
such a small force. Castrillon said: "Nothing avails here 
against the caprice, arbitrary will and ignorance of that 
man."" General Sesma spoke of Santa Anna's ruining "him- 
self and us by his confounded haste and by refusing to listen 
to his friends."25 Santa Anna himself justified this rash ad- 
<< 
vance ahead of his main body of troops, saying: A single 
blow would have been mortal to their cause . . . and such a 
blow depended on the rapidity of my movements."'" 
Santa Anna scorned Houston's small, ragged, poorly 
equipped army which he thought he had left behind, but 
which about this time was moving down to San Jacinto for 
the kill. As proof of his contempt, he freed a Negro slave 
whom he had captured somewhere in the vicinity of FIouston 
and sent him with instructions "to go and tell Houston that 
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I know where he is and that I am coming up to smoke him 
out after cleaning out those land thieves in Harri~burg,"'~ 
meaning Burnet, De Zavala, and the other leaders. 
Several of Houston's men were deserting because of his 
reluctance to attack the enemy. The Mexicans say, though, 
that they were deserting from fear, and that Houston was 
forced to tell his men falsely that Santa Anna had been 
obliged to return to Mexico to quell a revolt against his 
authority. They charge further that President Burnet's dis- 
trust of Houston was such that he placed John Rusk in 
Houston's camp as a spy to see if Houston was not doing 
more drinking than planning for victory. The report came 
back that Houston had given up drinking, only to start tak- 
ing opium. Concerning this latter point, it is interesting to 
note that when Santa Anna was brought captive before 
Houston the day after the battle of San Jacinto, i t  was 
asserted that he asked for opium to calm his nerves, and 
that Houston gave it to him. 
Colonel Pedro Delgado, one of those captured at San 
Jacinto gives us some interesting sidelights on the move- 
ments of the Mexicans to their doom.28 On April 14 Santa 
Anna crossed the Brazos with his six hundred men, and on 
the same day reached Oyster Creek near present Sugar- 
land where, in good humor and with never a thought for 
Houston, he watched his floundering, cursing troops trying 
to cross with their stubborn mules, several of which drowned. 
They continued on through Harrisburg because the Texas 
leaders had fled, and through New Washington, looting and 
burning everything the Americans had left behind, until on 
April 20 a Mexican officer who had been reconnoitering 
rushed in to report that the Americans were close on the 
rear, capturing and shooting all the Mexican straggIers. 
40 The Rice Institute Pamphlet 
Whereupon Santa Anna excitedly jumped on his horse, 
galloped out of the town into the grove where his men were 
encamped, knocked one man down and rode over another, 
- 
shouting: "The enemy is coming, the enemy is coming." 
The alarm of their general so upset the men that it was only 
with the greatest difficulty, and amid contradictory orders 
and confusion, that a column of attack was formed. The 
Mexicans then nloved folward in search of the enemy, whoin 
they came upon sheltered in a large wood on the San Jacinto 
battleground. 
In his Manifesto addressed to his fellow citizens, May 10, 
1837, Santa Anna stated: 
While on the road, Captain Barraghn caille to inform me that 
the enemy was approaching Lynchburg. As a matter of fact, 
being desirous of an engagement, I had the satisfaction of 
seeing it, of confirming the information I had of its strength 
and of observing that it had taken a disadvantageous posi- 
tion. . . . I was now in a position to choose the location for 
battle; and I shut up the enemy in the low marshy angle of 
the country where its retreat was cut off by Buffalo Bayou 
and the San Jacinto. . . . I mysclf occupied the highest part of 
the terrah2" 
Caro asked two questions concerning these statements 
whic11 Santa Anna never had time to answer in the forty 
years of life that remained to him: First, why did he think 
he had entrapped an enemy who had willingly taken up its 
position for battle? Second, why did he think he occupied 
the favored position, since the enemy had arrived first and 
had first choice? Delgado also criticized Santa Anna on this 
score, saying that any youngster could have picked a better 
position. 
After a light skiimish on the twentieth, both camps lay 
down to await the momentous day. The twenty-first dawned 
bright and clear after many weeks of rain, and Houston is 
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reported by the Mexicans to have made this pompous 
remark: "The sun of Austerlitz is shining again."30 This and 
other similar statements have led the Mexicans to charge 
that Houston considered himself another Napoleon. 
Despite the fact that Santa Anna said he had observed 
the enemy and "confilmed the  inf farm at ion he had of its 
strength," many Mexican officers, certainly as reliable as 
Santa Anna, have stated that the general thought it im- 
possible for I-Iouston to have advanced so quickly to San 
Jacinto since the latest reports placed him at Groce's Land- 
ing, near present Hempstead, many muddy miles away. 
Santa Anna suspected that the near-by enemy was a group 
of volunteers recently arrived from the United States. 
Furthermore, he could not have observed much of it, for 
Houston had concealed himself in the wood expressly to 
prevent the Mexicans from ascertaining that his force had 
dwindled from about twelve hundred men to seven hundred. 
Not knowing exactly who these men were, nor how great 
their number, the Mexican general sent for help. He asked 
Filisola, who was still crossing the Brazos with some two 
thousand men, to send him five hundred picked soldiers, 
without baggage, under General Cos. 
Cos arrived shortly before noon on the twenty-first with 
only four hundred men because, as he had started with bag- 
gage, the other hundred were obliged to fall behind to pull 
the baggage from the mud. Moreover, the four hundred who 
arrived were, according to Santa Anna, raw recruits who 
hindered rather than helped when the American attack 
began. You will take these for what they are-the alibis of a 
desperate nlan trying to conceaI his own negligence by 
attributing the defeat at San Jacinto to the stupidity of one 
man: not himself, but Filosola. 
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The Americans watched in consternation the arrival of 
these additional troops, then destroyed the bridge over 
Vince's Bayou, by which all troops of both sides had had to 
pass to arrive at that spot. This was done to stop further 
Mexican reinforcements, though some assert it was for the 
purpose of preventing the escape of the Mexicans, so confi- 
dent were the Americans of victory. Santa Anna gave this 
reason for its destruction: "The bridge had been buined by 
the enemy to retard our pursuing him."31 This nebulous 
reasoning does not account for the fact that, while it would 
effectively retard pursuit beyond the bayou by the Mexicans, 
it would also retard the flight of the Americans across the 
bayou, bringing certain death. 
Siesta time was approaching and Santa Anna and most of 
his staff, together with the new men who had marched all 
night, lay down to sleep, first posting a watch under the 
command of General Castrillon, The latter was killed in the 
ensuing battle while trying bravely to rally his men, but 
Santa Anna says that his lack of vigilance was one of the 
contributing causes of his defeat. 
Delgado says that the attack began at  about 4:30 P.M., 
and that all of the horses were unsaddled, some of them 
grazing, others being ridden bareback to and fsom water. 
Most of those men who were not sleeping or riding bare- 
back were out cutting branches for shelter. Some of Hous- 
ton's men were watching the Mexicans from the tallest trees 
through a "marine spy glass," so the attack was launched 
with a fair certainty of success. 
Delgado continues his narrative, relating how the sur- 
prised Mexicans hid behind trees while his Excellency "was 
running about in the utmost excitement, wringing his hands, 
unable to give an order." Santa Anna gave a very different 
account of his actions: 
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I had issued orders for strict vigilance to insure our safety, 
It was, however, overconfidence that lulled the zeal of those 
in whom I trusted. . . . Upon awakening, I saw that the 
enemy had completely surprised our camp. In vain I tried 
to repair the evil. I exhausted all my efforts to turn the tide.3e 
The cavalry finally succeeded in saddling a few horses, 
and Santa Anna mounted one and sped away. Or, as he him- 
self delicately expressed it: "A servant of my aide-de-camp 
Colonel Juan Bringas, offered me his horse, and with the 
tenderest and most urging expressions insisted on my riding 
off the field."" He attempts to hide his cowardice, declaring 
he only wished to reach Filisola's army which he would 
lead back to avenge his misfortune. I t  is doubtful, however, 
if Santa Anna could have reorganized Filisola's terror- 
stricken army even if he had reached it, for the few Mexi- 
cans who had escaped from San Jacinto had already re- 
ported to Filisola that the Texans numbered at least six 
thousand. 
Mexicans refer to San Jacinto not as a " d e f e a t Y ~ u t  as a 
"surprise." Santa Anna, after enumerating the causes that 
led to the catastrophe, stated: "It was fate, therefore, and 
fate alone that clipped the wings of victory that was about 
to crown our  effort^."^' General Filisola, after beginning his 
retreat towards Mexico, issued the following proclamation: 
C' A cowardly and perfidious enemy has been able by chance 
to acquire advantages over the section [of the arnly] com- 
manded personally by the president. . . . They will immensely 
regret the accidental triumph that they have attained,"" 
In  the long controversy among the Mexicans concerning 
the blame for the disaster, each of the participants felt 
obliged to write a book defending his honor and criticizing 
the others. Santa Anna, obviously the most derelict in his 
duty, said: "The responsibility of Filisola was obvious, be- 
cause he and only h e  caus;d such a catastrophe by his 
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criminal disobedience."" Urrea also blamed Filisola; Filisola 
blamed Santa Anna and Urrea; Caro, Delgado, and almost 
all others accused Santa Anna. 
When Santa Anna was captured on the twenty-second, in 
disguise, he refused to reveal his identity until a move- 
ment of curiosity by the other Mexican prisoners betrayed 
him; then he boldly acknowledged that he was the com- 
mander-in-chief, and said: "That man may consider himself 
born to no common destiny, who has conquered the Napo- 
leon of the West; and now it remains for him to be generous 
to the ~anquisl~ed."~' Houston reminded him that he should 
have thought of that at the Alamo, and asked what excuse 
he had to offer for the massacre at Goliad, in view of the 
fact that Fannin had surrendered on the condition that the 
men be spared and sent back to the United States. To this 
Sallta Anna replied: 
I declare to you, General, I did not know they had sur- 
rendered. General Urrea informed me he had conquered 
them: hence I ordered their execution. If the day ever comes 
when I get my hands on Urrea, I will execute him for his 
falsehood.38 
The President's secretary states that three trunkfuls of 
orders and correspondence were left behind with Filisola, 
and .that if these had been captured, Houston would have 
had proof, written by Caro and signed by Santa Anna, that 
the latter knew all the facts and had arbitrarily ordered the 
executions. Caro concluded that it was fortunate for both 
himself and Santa Anna that the trunks were taken to 
Mexico. 
After an interval Colonel Almonte, who spoke English 
well, took up the conversation and asked Houston why he 
had not attacked in force on the twentieth before the Mexi- 
can reinforcements arrived. Houston replied, drawing a 
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partly eaten ear of dry corn from his pocket, "You talk about 
reinforcements, Sir, i t  matters not how many reinforcements 
you have, you never can conquer free men as long as their 
General can marc11 four days with one ear of corn for his 
rations."" Santa Anna, who understood no English, asked 
what was being discussed. Years later he said "that this was 
the first moment he had ever understood the American char- 
acter; and that what he had witnessed convinced him that 
Americans never could be ~onquered. ' '~~ 
The Mexican leader turned out to be a valuable prisoner. 
He was easily induced to bring about the withdrawal across 
the Rio Grande of the remaining Mexican armies, still a 
formidable force of more than four thousand men. In  addi- 
tion, he signed two treaties ending hostiIities and acknowl- 
edging Texas independence. The withdrawal of Mexican 
troops was ordered on the first day of Santa Anna's captivity. 
Then in a letter to Filisola three days later, he wrote: 
I recomnlend that you comply with my official orders respect- 
ing the retreat of the troops as early as possible. I t  is neces- 
sary for the security of the prisoners and particularIy for that 
of your affectionate fi-iend and comrade, Antonio Lopez de 
Santa Anna.J1 
I t  is interesting here to recall his bolder words a year later 
when he was defending himself from his critics in Mexico: 
"I would have suffered a thousand deaths rather than reflect 
on the honor of Me~ico. ' '~~ 
Finally, on June 1, 1836, the prisoner was permitted to 
embark on a ship bound for Mexico, and during the two days 
before the ship was to sail, he issued the following fond fare- 
well to his late enemies: 
My friends: I have been a witness to your courage on the 
field of battle and know you to be generous. Rely always on 
my friendship and you shall never regret the considerations 
you have sllown me. In returning, through your kindness, 
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to the land of my birth, I beg you to accept this sincere fare- 
well from your grateful friend. 
F a r e ~ e l l : ~ ~  
Santa Anna was forcibly talten from the vessel by some 
two hundred volunteers wllo had just arrived from New 
Orleans (the Mexicans called them "wait-and-see patriots") 
and again imprisoned, this time in Columbia. As a result of 
a pIot to escape with the aid of the Mexican consul in New 
Orleans, a ball and chain were put on his foot. Housto~l 
argued that Santa Anna should be returned to Mexico, for, 
in Houston's words, he would keep the country in such tur- 
moil that Texas would never again be menaced. That is 
exactly what happened. 
After Houston was elected president of Texas in Septem- 
ber, 1836, he sent Santa Anna to Washington to confer with 
President Jackson. William H. Wharton, the first minister of 
Texas to the United States, was already in Washington 
negotiating for the recognition of Texas independence. He 
reported that Santa Anna said to him: "The treasury of the 
United States is well filled; I hope you, as Minister from 
Texas, will not obstruct my gove~nment from obtaining a 
few millions fsom this governnlent for a quit claim to Te~as.''~' 
From Washington Santa Anna returned directly to Mexico 
in February, 1837, As he was a leading personality in the 
struggle for Texas, perhaps a few words may be said about 
what fate was reserved for our villain. 
After almost two years of seclusion, Be regained his 
prestige in the so-called "Pastry War" with the French in 
December, 1838. The French made a landing at Vera Cruz 
after the Mexicans had refused to pay indemnities for dam- 
ages suffered by a French baker in a Mexican riot. After a 
few skirmishes the French were rather leisurely re-embark- 
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ing when Santa Anna galloped up and was shot in the leg 
by a cannon. As a result the leg was amputated and Santa 
Anna never failed to recall how he had braverly shed his 
blood for his country, and how, in his words, he had chased 
the French into the sea. 
This leg occasioned one of the most ludicrous events in 
all history. At the height of Santa Anna's power in 1842 
some of his flatterers, or more probably jokesters, decided 
tliat the leg should be  given a hero's burial. Accordingly, the 
funeral procession, accompanied by Santa Anna himself, 
entered the capital and made its way to the shrine where 
the leg was interred amidst laudatory orations and general 
mourning. It is not stated whether or not a Requiem Mass 
was said for the departed sole. 
Also !in 1839, Santa Anna put down a rebellion led by 
Genera1 Josk Antonio Mejfa, the former Colonel Mejia who 
had received such an ovation at Brazoria in 1832. He 
ordered Mejia shot within three hours. Mejia, i t  is reported, 
said that if he had been victor and Santa Anna the van- 
quished, he would have shot the latter in three minutes. 
Santa Anna was elected president in 1841, again in 1845, 
and in 1846. In 1846 and 1847 came the war with the United 
States, and Santa Anna, now called the Immortal Three- 
Quarters as a result of the missing leg, appointed himself 
commander of the Mexican armies with the usual results. 
Then came exile until Santa Anna succeeded in regaining 
the presidency for the last time in 1853. In 1856 he was 
again exiled, this time for eighteen years. 
In 1866, while in exile in Jamaica, he was visited by our 
Secretary of State Seward, who was searching for a suc- 
cessor to Maxirnilian whom we wished to oust in accordance 
with the Monroe Doctrine, now that the CiviI War had 
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ended. A group of swindlers, learning of thiis visit, sent Santa 
Anna a leker to which they forged Seward's name, informing 
him that he had been chosen to lead the expedition for which 
we had appropriated fifty million dollars, of which thirty 
maion was to be at the personal disposition of Santa Anna. 
A ship was sent to get Santa Anna, and he was immediately 
informed that the money, though appropriated, was not yet 
available, and that it would be necessaiy for him to advance 
a large sum of money to retain the ship. He obliged with a 
down payment of seventy thousand dollars. Then he was 
taken to New York, where he was kept paying fake bills for 
imaginary supplies until he had spent several hundred thou- 
sand dollars. Some have estimated that the amount may have 
exceeded a million. 
After the inevitable expos&, Santa Anna returned to 
Jamaica, from which he was recalled in 1874 to spend the 
last two years of his life in his native land. In 1876 he died 
penniless and almost forgotten, but hopeful to the end that 
he might once more rally a new generation of Mexicans 
behind him. 
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